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International News: In early 2025, two Iranian cargo ships — Golban and Jayran — quietly departed China’s Taicang Port. Their destination: Iran’s Bandar Abbas. At first glance, the shipment seemed routine— containers loaded with industrial materials. But security experts quickly sensed something amiss. By the time the vessels docked after a three-week voyage, intelligence agencies had already flagged the cargo: over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a highly volatile chemical used in solid rocket propellants. The secrecy, the route, and the receiver all pointed to one thing — this was no ordinary shipment.
The chemical's potential raised global alarm. According to defense analysts, the material can be used to manufacture up to 1,300 tons of solid rocket fuel, enough to power nearly 260 medium-range missiles like Iran’s Kheibar Shekan and Haj Qassem. These very missile types have recently been deployed in strikes against Israeli targets. What made the transfer even more sensitive was that the delivery was reportedly made for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — Iran’s most powerful military entity, long designated under U.S. sanctions.
Reports reveal that the cargo — spread across 34 containers on the Golban and 24 on the Jayran — was received under the supervision of IRGC-linked personnel. The deal bypassed restrictions using a private Iranian company and a Hong Kong-based Chinese supplier. On June 5, The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran placed a large order of ammonium perchlorate, another dual-use chemical, indicating a sustained effort to build missile fuel capacity. If converted efficiently, this supply chain could power 800 short to medium-range ballistic missiles.
These revelations come just months after a deadly explosion rocked Iran’s Shahid Rajaei Port in April 2025, killing several and damaging infrastructure. Sources now suggest that the explosion may have involved mishandling of the same hazardous chemicals. The IRGC's growing stockpile not only violates the spirit of existing international arms agreements but also raises fears of a clandestine missile build-up — one that operates beneath the radar of watchdogs and regulators.
Despite multiple sanctions on Iran and its shipping networks, this operation highlights the continuing loopholes exploited through offshore intermediaries and state-backed shipping fleets. With Iran increasingly using its missile power in regional conflicts — often through proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen — the international community is under pressure to reassess the real reach of Iranian armament capabilities. China's involvement, even if indirect, further complicates the geopolitical narrative.